



We have a surfeit of deregulatory anniversaries to celebrate or
deplore: it is now more than thirty years since the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) authorized substantial competition in
long-distance communications,' more than eleven since we deregu-
lated the airlines, and almost ten years since we did substantially the
same to the railroad and trucking industries.! Can we, by examining
this long and varied experience with deregulation, draw any
conclusions about the likelihood and desirability of its continuation
in the decade ahead?
In this attempt to place deregulation in historical perspective, I
feel compelled to emphasize, in contradiction of the widespread
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popular impression that President Reagan deserves most of the
credit--or blame-how much of it occurred between 1978 and 1980.'
While deregulation has dramatically transformed the transporta-
tion industries, its effect on the traditional public utilities, while
substantial, can easily be exaggerated. Two years ago, in a sym-
posium on "The Surprises of Deregulation," Robert Crandall
shrewdly observed that the greatest surprise in the case of telecom-
munications was how little had actually occurred.4  Customer
premises equipment aside, the overwhelming majority of transactions
continue to be thoroughly regulated. And AT&T, which had agreed
to divest its putatively naturally monopolistic services and confine
itself to competitive operations, continues nonetheless to be heavily
regulated.'
I have been guilty of some such exaggeration myself, in specu-
lating several years ago that we might at last be witnessing the
fulfillment of Horace Gray's ancient celebration of "the passing of
the public utility concept:" 6
Gray intended his title to be historically descriptive, and not
merely hortatory. The celebration was premature ...
In contrast, the last decade has witnessed such dramatic mod-
ifications and abandonments of the traditional institution that
I suggest it is now possible to talk realistically about the
passing of the public utility concept ...
The institution of closely regulated, confined, franchised
monopoly, which produced reasonably satisfactory results for
all parties, including the public, until around 1970, has proved
progressively unsuited to the drastically altered condition of
the American economy since that time. I think history is on
the way to proving that Horace Gray was something of a
3. Even so knowledgeable a student as Roger Noll has credited President Reagan
with dismantling the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), merely because it happened during
his term. Noll, Regulation After Reagan, REGULATION, Number 3, 1988, at 13. Also, most
people credit Reagan with deregulating crude oil, even though it was President Carter who
set the process on a definite two and a half year time schedule; his successor's contribution
was to compress the remaining nine months into one immediately on taking office.
4. Crandall, Surprises from Telephone Deregulation and the AT&T Divestiture, 78 AM.
ECON. REV., PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 323 (1988). The same is true of electric power and
local distribution of gas.
5. See G. FAULHABER, supra note 2, at 85-87.
6. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. lAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8
(1940).
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prophet-a premature one (if it is not excessively redundant
of me to say so), and a simplistic one, but something of a
prophet nonetheless
More cautious than Gray, I hedged my predictions and prescrip-
tions. Where deregulation had been incomplete, I observed, the
reciprocal interpenetration of markets by regulated and unregulated
companies required regulatory prevention of cross-subsidization and
abuse of monopoly power. I also professed agnosticism about the
feasibility of competition across the board in electric generation,
dithered on the desirability of deregulating basic cable television
service and petroleum pipelines, described my own efforts to ensure
effective protection of shippers captive to the otherwise deregulated
railroads, and recognized that similar exploitation was almost
certainly happening in some thin airline markets. Still, considering
the continuing pervasive regulation of the public utilities, I, like
Gray, could justly be described as a "premature prophet" of their
passing.
There is, however, also a great deal going on, almost all of it in
the direction I predicted. Of especial significance, the major issues
of regulatory policy these days in the public utility arena are not
whether or how to return to the dosed world of franchised,
thoroughly regulated monopolies, but how to accommodate tradi-
tional regulation to the increasing intrusion of competition. Among
the leading examples of that intrusion are:
the growth of electric generation by non-utility
enterprises-both "qualifying facilities" under the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) and so-called
independent power producers;9
7. Kahn, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept: A Reprise, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TODAY AND TOMORROW 3, 4, 5, 27 (E. Noam ed. 1983) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
Kahn, A Reptise].
8. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988)).
See generaUy Joskow, Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the Electric
Power Industry, 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIViTY: MICRoECONOMICS 124,
153-74, 184-85.
9. Non-utility generation accounts for only about four percent of total national
capacity. See EDISON ELECRIC INSTITUTE, 1989 CAPACITY AND GENERATION OF NON-
UTILITY SOURCES OF ENERGY (1989). But it accounts for one third or more of planned
additions. J. WILE, THE DEMAND FOR NEW GENERATING CAPACITY (Nat'l. Econ. Res. Assoc.
1989), provides an estimate of 30 percent of planned additions. Mason Willrich quotes a
figure of 44 percent of "capacity under construction or advanced development." The
Competitive Wholesale Electric Generation Act, 1989: Hearings on Amend. 267 to S. 406 Before the
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" the deregulation of certain wholesale bulk power sales,
where the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
has satisfied itself that the transactions were at arms' length
and untainted by monopoly or monopsony power; 0
" the requirement by an increasing number of state utility
commissions that local electric companies obtain their
additional power requirements via competitive bids;"
* the decision by many states to permit electric companies to
exercise discretion in pricing, within a stipulated range, in
order to meet competition, forestall cogeneration, and retain
or attract industry; 2
* the proposal by FERC to permit local gas distribution
companies to replace long-term commitments to buy gas
from open access pipelines with arrangements to purchase
transportation alone;"
* the total deregulation of telephone equipment, which is
now highly competitive; 4 and
" the burgeoning of private communications networks, to such
a point that more business phones are now linked in the
Senate Comm. on Enear and Natural Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1989) (statement of
Mason Wlich, Pres. and CEO, PG&E Enterprises).
10. R. FITZGIBBONS, BEYOND THE FERC NOPRS: TRENDS IN ELECTRIC UTILITY
REGULATION (Natl. Econ. Res. Assoc. 1989).
11. Fourteen commissions have done so, twelve others are considering it. 'Willrich,
supra note 9, at 5.
12. R. FRAME, COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIAL RATS (Nat'l. Econ. Res. Assoc. 1987).
13. Batla, Order 500 Joins Order 451 on the Critical I, NATURAL GAS, Dec. 1989, at
1. In 1982, interstate pipelines owned 78 percent of the natural gas they carried; by 1987
that share had fallen to less than one-third. For the remainder, the pipelines provided the
transportation as a separate service. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., OffiCE OF OIL & GAS,
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, GRowTH IN UNBUNDLED NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION SERVICES:
1982-87, at ix-x (1988).
14. See Crandall, Afir the Breakup: U.S. Telecommunications in a More Competitive
Era (Nov. 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). See also Noll & Owen, United
States v. AT&T: An Interim Assessment, in FUTURE COMPErrrION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
172-86 (S. Bradley & J. Hausman ed. 1989).
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first instance to their own switches than to those of the local
telephone company."5
Among such quasi-public utilities as financial service institutions and
transportation, the processes of market interpenetration and unregu-
lated pricing are even further advanced.
Despite these developments, most transactions at the core of the
traditional public utilities, such as the local provision of telephone,
electric and gas service, continue to be tightly regulated, and there
seems little prospect or desirability of that situation changing
fundamentally in the next decade. In these circumstances, my
predictions and prescriptions about the future course of deregulation
in the structurally competitive industries, on the one side, and the
structurally monopolistic markets, on the other, will necessarily differ
from one another.
There will, however, be a common theme and a consistent set
of conclusions:
The case for deregulation has been that direct regulation
typically suppressed competition, or at least severely distorted
it, and that competition, freed of such direct restraints, is a far
preferable system of economic control. I read the recent
experience as having essentially vindicated that proposition,
making substantial reversal of the deregulatory trend unlikely.
Where competition is not feasible throughout an industry
or market, as in the traditional public utilities, entry of
unregulated competition can introduce distortions so severe as
to make the mixed system the worst of both possible worlds.
The preferable remedy is not to suppress the competition, but
to make the residual regulation as consistent as possible with
it. That seems to be the direction in which regulators are
moving.
The abolition of direct economic regulation is by no means
synonymous with laissez faire. On the contrary, it may call for
government interventions no less vigorous than direct regula-
tion itself, but fundamentally different in character and intent.
The progressive realization of this fact in recent years makes
15. P. W. HUBER, THE GEODESIC NETWORKi: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN
THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 2.5-2.7 (Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice 1987).
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for a bifurcated prognosis for the 1990s: the historic trend of
direct economic deregulation is unlikely to be reversed, but
government will play an increasingly active role in attempting
to preserve competition and remedy its imperfections. And that
is what it should do.
I. The Prospects for Reregulation
One way of trying to judge whether the recent deregulatory
trends are likely to continue or be reversed is to consider the root
causes of these remarkable historical changes" and appraise the
likelihood of their persistence.
Perhaps the most fundamental of these has been the rediscovery
all over the world of the virtues of the free market. It was obviously
no accident that many of the comprehensive governmentally-admin-
istered cartelizations overturned during the late 1970s and early
1980s were established during the Great Depression, when confi-
dence in the market economy was at its nadir. While the present en-
thusiasm for market capitalism will doubtless be subject to ebbs and
flows in the years ahead, it is difficult to envision an early return to
centralized governmental command and control systems, of which
our regimes of economic regulation were an exemplar in microcosm.
There is no sign of let up, either, in the technological explosion
that made inevitable the collapse of almost all the historic regulatory
barriers against competitive interpenetrations in telecommunications,
and bids fair to do the same among financial institutions. It was the
development of microwave that presented large users with the
irresistible opportunity to escape the regulatorily-dictated over-
charging of interexchange services. Similarly, the geometrically
declining cost and increased versatility of switching has made
possible the proliferation of privately-owned networks and privately-
provided sophisticated telecommunications services; and fiber optics
will probably doom the present artificial separation of cable television
and information services from telephony.
A. Vested Interests in Deregulation
The deregulations of the last fifteen years were powerfully
motivated also by changes in the configuration of the private
16. See generally Kahn, The Poltical Feasibility of Regulatoy Reform: How Did We Do t?,
in REFORMING SOCIAL REGULATION: ALTFRNATIVE PUBLIC POLICY STRATEGIEs 247 (1982).
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interests most directly affected. The Staggers Act' was passed in
large measure because of the growing disenchantment of the
railroads with their historic regulatory bargain with government that
protected them from competition but also systematically impeded
them from competing effectively, forced them to maintain thousands
of miles of track on which they were losing money, and limited their
ability to raise their charges to customers with relatively inelastic
demands. Similarly, airline deregulation owed a great deal to the
unhappiness of United Airlines with the CAB's systematic denial to
it of the ability to enter new markets or desert old ones. The
insistence of large customers that they be released from the burdens
of cross-subsidization to which they had been subjected by the FCC
and state commissions was an important part of the reason for the
breakup of AT&T's monopoly; in the same way, the competitive
encroachments on the formerly protected markets of the electric and
gas utilities came about because of the desire of large industrial
customers to take advantage of emerging opportunities to make bulk
purchases at bargain rates in the field and from outside suppliers
with excess capacity. And one reason for the receptivity of the
electric industry to competitive generation was the reluctance of
many of its members to undertake construction of new baseload
generating stations, because of the stunning regulatory disallowances
of previously incurred construction costs to which they had been
subjected in the early and mid-1980s.'
It is the converse of the foregoing proposition that is the more
relevant for the future. There are now vested interests in deregula-
tion itself-politically or economically powerful entities that, having
now achieved freedom from regulation, will not readily surrender it.
That is part of what I intended when I said that my colleagues and
I at the CAB were going to get the airline eggs so scrambled that
no one was ever going to be able to unscramble them. Although
many of the thousands of new truckers and small bus companies
17. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 45, and 49 U.S.C.).
18. As the foregoing account already suggests, while the deregulation movement was
powerfully motivated by historical factors affecting the economy at large and economic
policy generally, its explanation must be sought also in circumstances peculiar to the
individual industries affected. For example, it is highly unlikely that our regulatory policies
affecting the electric utilities would have been so substantially changed had that industry
continued to perfbrm as it had during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s. In contrast with
telecommunications, where the most powerful motivating force was technological progress,
in the energy sector the motivating force was, in important measure, technological and
institutional failure. See, e.g., Joskow, supra note 8, at 149-63; R. F. HlRSH, TECHNOLOGY
AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE AMERICAN ELECRIc UTIUTY INDUSTRY (1989).
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and many of the hundreds of railroad ventures that have taken over
the trackage and thin routes that larger companies were unable to
operate profitably, and many of the cogenerators and small-scale
generators of hydro- and wind power that have eagerly entered the
doors opened by deregulation have already gone bankrupt, and
many more will, the survivors are not going to permit the govern-
ment to retract the invitation to compete. Moreover, the previous
incumbents now have a freedom to manage their own operations,
configure their own service offerings and set their own prices that
will be very hard to take away. Where the deregulatory process has
been only partial, the companies that remain thoroughly regulated
devote most of their energies to demanding "symmetry," by which
they mean not a restoration of restraints on their newer competitors,
but corresponding freedom for themselves. The principle applies
symmetrically to deregulation and regulation: once instituted, they
tend to be progressive and cumulative. 9
These forces explain why the process can be essentially inadvert-
ent, as it was in the case of telecommunications. No planner laid
out in advance the path of decisions from Hush-a-Phone and Above
890 through Carterphone, MCI, Specialized Common Carriers,
Execunet, AT&T's stonewalling response, the Modified Final
Judgment conduding the ensuing antitrust litigation, and the FCC's
MTS/WATS Market Structure and three Computer Inquiries. Yet
each step led logically to the next, and they were all in the same
direction. 2'
The same process is underway in the financial services field. Once
we permitted brokerage houses to offer the equivalent of demand
deposits and retail chains to provide home mortgages and credit
card services, once we removed ceilings on interest rates payable by
savings institutions, it was inevitable that we would loosen the
previous restraints on the permissible lending and investment
activities of the savings institutions and permit commercial banks to
underwrite commercial paper.
19. On the tendency of regulation to spread, see, e.g., A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 28-
32. For a study of the effects of deregulation, see Kahn, Applications of Economics to an
Imperfect World, 69 Am. ECON. REv., PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 1 (1979).
20. See text accompanying supra notes 1-2. See also Kahn, The Future of Local Telephone
Service: Technology and Public Policy, in TOWARD THE YEAR 2000 88-90 (1987); Crandall, supra
note 14.
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B. Distortions and Tensions of Partial Deregulation
In the electric and gas utilities, similarly, partial deregulation has
introduced a host of asymmetries and distortions, which have been
and are still being resolved primarily by further liberalizations. The
basic problem is that the rates charged by the utility companies,
which inevitably play a central role in deciding which competitive
transactions take place and which do not, contain a very large
component of capital carrying charges on investments valued at
embedded (i.e., at depreciated original) cost, not marginal cost.
Under partial deregulation, therefore, many competitive purchase
and production decisions are made on the basis of comparisons
between those economically meaningless, traditionally regulated rates,
on the one side, and competitive costs or prices on the other.
Businesses will decide whether to generate their own electric power
or construct their own communications systems by comparing the
current, true economic cost to them of doing so with the regulated
rates they would otherwise have to pay. Where those rates are
higher than the marginal or avoided costs of the electric or tele-
phone company itself-as they have been by wide margins in recent
years, because of the presence in rate base of high-cost, excess
generating capacity, or inadequately depreciated telephone
plant2-the decisions by customers to provide the service themselves
can produce inefficient results.
For the same reason, when differences in regulated rates cause
large-volume buyers to shift their patronage from one electric
company to another, or from a gas pipeline or distribution company
to producers in the field, it need not be that the marginal costs of
the new supplier are lower than the avoided costs of the former
one. Often, in fact, their short-run marginal costs are identical-for
example, when both suppliers are part of the same power pool. The
most powerful inducement for high-volume gas customers to desert
their historic pipeline and distribution company suppliers has been
the billions of dollars of sunk costs embodied in the rates of their
former suppliers because of commitments they had made to take or
pay for very high-cost gas at a time when supplies were critically
short. As a result, a large number of transactions have been entered
into because of decisions distorted by regulation itself, and there is
21. See Rohlf&, 'Miles to Go: The Need for Additional Reforms in Capital Recovery Methods,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 63 (Nat'l Econ. Res. Assoc. 1989).
See also A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 146-50; Kahn, The Uneasy Marriage of Regulation and
Competition, TELE A TCS, Sept. 1984, at 1, 2, 8-17.
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no assurance that the supply function is distributed among com-
petitors on the basis of their comparative efficiency.
The legal obligation of utility companies to serve on demand,
which requires them to incur the costs of installing the capacity
necessary to fulfill that obligation, creates a similar distortion. So
long as they were monopolies, their customers had, in effect, a
corresponding obligation to pay rates reflecting those sunk costs if
prudently incurred. In contrast, the customers who are now free to
shop around or to supply their own needs can escape that obliga-
tion. If their shift is feasible only because, while evading the costs of
keeping the option available to them, they nevertheless retain the
right to return to their local utilities and demand service without
penalty when their economical supplies elsewhere dry up, or their
own generators fail, or their own telephone circuits are busy, the
shift may involve not an improvement, but a loss in economic
efficiency."
C. Regulatoy Adaptations
The still emerging resolution of these distortions has had several
components.
Legislatures and regulatory commissions have been giving the
utility companies increased freedom to reduce prices as low as their
incremental costs to meet competition. Occasionally, this freedom
has extended to the point of total deregulation of some services or
transactions, such as Centrex, telephone equipment on the cus-
tomer's premises, and some electric bulk power sales.
Also, both regulators and the passage of time have presided over
a partial writing off, settling out, accelerated recovery, and disal-
lowance of the heavy sunk costs-the multi-billion dollar take-or-
pay obligations of the gas pipelines, the long-term contractual
purchase obligations of the local gas distribution companies, the
22. On the separate problem of option demand and the possibility of market failure
in satisfying it, see Weisbrod, Collective-Consumption Services of Individual-Comnsmption Goods,
78 Q. J. oF ECON. 471 (1964); Kahn, The 7yranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures,
Imperfections, and the limits of Economics, 19 KYKLOS 23 (1966). On the possible distortion
of competition consequent on the failure to impose such a charge in the telephone industry.
see A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 238-39. For the most thorough exposition of the case for
such charges, see Weisman, Default Capacity Tariffs: Smoothing the Tranitional Regulatory
Asymmetries in the Telecommunications Market, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 149 (1988). See also Weisman,
Competitive Markets and Carriers of Last Resort, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 6, 1989. at 17;
Weisman, Optimal Re-contracting, Market Risk and the Regulated Firm in Competitive Transition,
12 Rxs. iN L. & ECON. 153 (1989).
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inflated costs of recently constructed or abandoned electric genera-
ting plants, and inadequately depreciated telephone company
plant--that have constituted the major source of discrepancy between
the companies' average revenue requirements for regulatory
purposes and their own incremental costs."
In a few cases, regulators have partially relaxed the utility's
obligation to serve customers who choose to escape their de facto
obligation to help carry fixed costs. Regulators have also considered
permitting the utility companies to impose a capacity reservation
charge--the leading example of which is the gas inventory holding
charge contemplated by FERC-on customers who wish to retain the
option of service on demand.4 In a few recent cases, where buyers
have had access to alternative suppliers, FERC has permitted the
utility's obligation to be limited explicitly to the volumes and
circumstances stipulated in long-term contracts.25
The importance and promise of individually negotiated long-term
contracts can hardly be exaggerated, both as a newly permissible
form of competition and as a device for reestablishing and rede-
fining the relationship between utility companies and individual
customers in a manner compatible with competition. In the electric
power industry, for example, the increasing tendency of the utility
companies to acquire their supplies by long-term contract has helped
to introduce competition into generation. Before the Staggers Act,
such contracts for rail transport were legally unenforceable: all rail
and truck carriage had to be at openly posted, uniform spot rates.
As a result, electric companies that had built generating plants in the
Southwest designed to burn coal from Wyoming and Montana found
themselves subjected to very sharp increases in the rail rates charged
them by the single railroad or pair of end-to-end carriers to which
they were captive. Since 1980, in contrast, most of the coal shipped
by rail has been covered by long-term contracts.
The ability, newly available under deregulation, to enter into such
arrangements, adapted to the particular needs of the individual
shipper and providing for rewards and penalties based on perform-
ance of the transportation function, is said to have been an essential
23. In the case of the electric companies, the discrepancy has been reduced in many
areas by marginal costs moving up toward average charges as growth in demand has
outpaced additions to capacity.
24. See Kahn, A Reprise, supra note 7, at 18-21 (tracing dissolution of this obligation
in the case of the airlines and motor carriers, and even incipient efforts in the electric
utilities).
25. R. FITZGIBBONS, supra note 10, at 11.
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factor in the rapid spread of just-in-time inventory and logistical
control systems, which have produced cost savings estimated in the
scores of billions of dollars a year."
There has been no abatement in the zeal of regulatory commis-
sions to protect residential and small commercial customers, almost
all of whom remain captive to the local utility companies, from being
forced to assume the sunk costs that the competitive markets can no
longer be forced to bear. To some extent, they have continued to do
so by discouraging "cream-skimming" competition-for example, by
competitive providers of long-distance telephone service intrastate, or
by proprietors of "smart buildings," providing telecommunications
services for their tenants. 7 Increasingly, however, regulators have
been developing methods consistent with, rather than obstructive of,
the new competition-a tendency most fully developed in the field
of telecommunications.
The simplest of these new methods has been a rate freeze for
basic telephone service, accompanied by stipulations that service
quality not deteriorate. The freeze may consist in a simple directive
or undertaking to maintain existing rates for a number of years.
Alternatively, it may provide for automatic adjustment to reflect
inflation or changes in taxes or interstate separations. The indexa-
tions typically incorporate an automatic downward adjustment
predicated on a targeted improvement in productivity, thereby
ensuring a continuation of the long-term decline of these rates in
real terms.
Such freezes or "social compacts" have some obvious virtues, both
political and economic. They provide direct, straightforward protec-
tion for consumers of the services that are the subject of most
26. R. DELANEY, FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION DEREGULATION, SEMINAR T9 ON ROAD
TRANSPORT DEREGULATION: EXPERIENCE, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH 6 (Arthur D. Little,
Inc.).
27. At times regulatory commissions have simply prohibited the utility companies
under their jurisdiction from offering special competitive rates to attract customers,
particularly where (1) the competitor's marginal or avoidable costs were no lower than those
of the customer's traditional supplier, and (2) the consequence of the transaction would
have been merely to shift the sunk costs inflating the rates of the latter from the departing
customer to the remaining ones. See, e.g., In re Lukens Steel Co., No. P-810310 (Pa. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, Jan. 13, 1984) (petition denied). In this case, the Pennsylvania Power and
Light Co. sought to attract a large industrial customer from the Philadelphia Electric Co.
with a favorable rate, even though both companies were generating their electricity from
a common pool dispatching power from the lowest marginal-cost supply source. Similarly,
the New York Public Service Commission dismissed the petition by some towns in
Westchester County to be served by New York State Electric and Gas rather than
Consolidated Edison. Interoffice Memorandum from Jean Cleary, Staff Counsel, to State
of New York Public Service Commission (July 12, 1974).
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intense regulatory concern. More important in the present context,
they sever the link between those rates and the revenues from the
more competitive services, and in this way, in principle, prevent
cross-subsidization of the latter offerings by the former. By so doing,
once again in principle, they make it possible to give the utility
companies greater freedom to compete for the business on which
they are challenged. Finally, by focusing regulation on prices rather
than rates of return, and fixing the course of those prices over a
period of time, these freezes or indexations mitigate the cost-plus
character of traditional regulation, and therefore enhance the
incentives of the companies to improve their efficiency.
These beneficent tendencies are sometimes reinforced by an
explicit or implicit acceptance of a wider than usual range within
which achieved rates of return are permitted to vary. Sometimes
there is an accompanying provision for companies and ratepayers
to share surplus profits, up to limits (before sharing) that would
have seemed unacceptably high by historical standards. The conse-
quently wider range of possible earnings, for longer periods of time,
presumably provides carriers with enhanced incentives not only to
minimize costs, but also to undertake risky investments and innova-
tions that would be discouraged if the returns from successful
ventures were limited to levels traditionally regarded as reasonable."8
Finally, the FCC now subjects AT&T's basic and non-basic
interstate services to separate rate caps--ceilings on average prices
(rather than on each individual one) indexed to inflation minus a
productivity target. It has decided to do the same with the services
28. The accompanying divorce of basic service rates from the companies' overall costs
and revenues relieves regulators to some extent of responsibility for scrutinizing the heavy
expenditures the companies are making in fiberoptic transmission and digital switching, with
a view to their possible disallowance. Since these outlays are typically justified only partly
in terms of minimizing the costs of basic service, and in part in order to be able to offer
new services the market for which is highly uncertain, regulators have naturally been
concerned that subscribers interested only in the former not be burdened by the costs and
greater risks properly attributable to the latter. Threatened with disallowance of some
portion of these outlays from rate base, while lacking the prospect of being permitted to
retain supernormal profits if the ventures prove successful, the companies may refrain from
undertaking relatively risky innovations that may nevertheless be socially desirable. Freezes
and indexations of basic service rates and variable rates of return tend to remove those
obstacles. See Kahn & Shew, Current Issues in Telecommunications Regulation. Pricing, 4 YALE
J. ON REG. 191 (1987).
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of the local companies under its jurisdiction, and some states as well
are now actively considering rate caps for intrastate services.0 9
These various regulatory devices tend to permit the utility
companies to compete effectively for business by offering rates as low
as their incremental costs, if necessary. In this way, they correct the
worst competitive distortion introduced by partial deregulation, while
limiting the ability of a company to recoup net revenue losses from
basic service customers. They also limit the extent to which the
company may compensate for reductions in competitive rates by
raising rates for non-basic services.
Of course, such arrangements openly invite the companies-and,
insofar as the adoption of rate caps is coupled with the opportunity
for a wider range of achieved rates of return, encourage them-to
introduce a finer discrimination in the prices they charge for their
several services. This is only a more polite way of saying that
deregulation permits a fuller exploitation of monopoly power.?
The counter-considerations--in my judgment compelling-are the
necessity of giving the utility companies freedom to meet the
29. In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, No. 87-313
(F.C.C. Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, adopted March 8. 1990); In re Policy
and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, No. 87-313 (F.C.C. Report and Order
and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, adopted March 16, 1989). For a
description of the FCC's plan and of a similar one adopted by the California Public Utilities
Commission, see Norris, Price Caps: An Alternative Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications
Carriers, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 18, 1990, at 44. On the pioneering British "RPI minus 3"
scheme, see Stelzer, Regulating Telecommunications in Britai: A New Alternative to the U.S.
Approach, TELEMATICS, Sept., 1986, at 7.
The Florida Commission has in effect grafted a kind of rate cap on the formal scheme
of variable rates of return that it accepted for Bell South, by explicitly excluding the
Company from the right to share in any surplus earnings that are the consequence of
increases in its average rates: "Southern Bell will not be permitted to enhance its profits
through rate increases. . . . We will allow any rate increases to be netted against rate
decreases." In re Petitions of Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company fbr Rate
Stabilization etc., No. 880069-TL and 870832-TL, Order No. 20162, slip. op., at 7-8 (Fla.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Oct. 13, 1988).
These direct restraints on prices-whether in the form of freezes, indexation provisions,
"social compacts," or rate caps-do not represent an abandonment of traditional rate of
return regulation. They typically contemplate periodic reexamination of the results and
readjustment of the formulas when and as rates of return range outside of acceptable limits.
In the last analysis, therefore, they are all forms of rate of return regulation. See, e.g., Noll,
Telecommunications Regulation in the 1990s, in 1 NEw DIREInONS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY 11 (P. Newburg ed. 1989). The potentially significant difference, in principle, is that
these various formulas may contemplate substantially longer regulatory lags, and therefore
imply a willingness on the part of both the commission and the company to accept returns
fluctuating and persisting within some range wider than would be permitted under
traditional regulation.
30. This is Joseph P. Gillan's objection to rate caps. Gillan, Reforming State Regulation
of Exchange Carrios, TELEMATCS, May, 1989, at 17.
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increasing competition they encounter in the provision of "non-
basic" services, and their entitlement to recover prudently incurred
costs. The former is grounded in considerations of both economic
efficiency and of retaining whatever contribution the competitive
markets may continue to make to holding down the rates for basic
service. The latter requires that the companies be allowed an
opportunity to recover the consequent net revenue losses elsewhere,
as the market will allow. The resulting discriminations are therefore
in the interest of subscribers to basic service, and they tend also to
minimize the aggregate distortions in customer choices created by
the need to price above marginal cost in order to recover total
costs.3'
D. Possible Reversions to Regulation
Each of these adaptations of regulatory policy to competition
represents a further loosening of restraints, rather than a reversal of
the deregulation process. Each therefore seems to support the
general expectation that the trend of the last ten to fifteen years will
persist. There are, however, two opposing possibilities.
The first is the far-from-negligible danger of a misguided
intensification of protectionism, in the event that we either fail to
cure the fundamental macroeconomic causes of our national balance
of trade deficit or we "solve" the problem by falling into a recession.
The public's enthusiasm for free competition varies inversely with
the unemployment rate.
The second possibility lies in the microeconomy of the electric
utility industry. Major sections of the country are likely to need
substantial additions to generating capacity within the next several
years. At present, a large portion of the increase is expected to be
supplied by non-utility generators using natural gas as their fuel. It
seems likely, however, that the present large natural gas supply
bubble will be exhausted during the 1990s, resulting in a sharp
increase in the field price. In that event, a large portion of those
expected additions to non-utility generating capacity may well not
materialize, and we may see the commissions and the public alike
turning back toward total reliance on their local utility companies.
In these circumstances, the recent vogue of regulatorily-required
31. See Baumol & Bradford, Optima Departures From Marginal Cost Prng, 60 AM.
ECON. REv. 265 (1970).
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least-cost planning" could well result in restoration of the traditional
"regulatory compact"-the mutual commitment on the part of the
companies to ensure the required expansions of capacity and of the
commissions, having lent their approval, to provide reasonable
assurances to the companies of recovering prudently incurred costs."
II. The Merits of Continued Non-Regulation
The future course of regulation and deregulation will be deter-
mined not only by the changing configurations of private interests,
prevailing political and economic philosophies and macroeconomic
conditions, but also by how we collectively appraise the record so
far. The difficulty is that the performance of even a single industry
is multi-faceted and never susceptible to a definitive evaluation; even
less is it possible to reach a simple, unequivocal verdict about the
effects of deregulation on the diverse collection of industries that
have been affected by it in varying ways and degrees over the last
fifteen years.
Nevertheless, I believe most economists would agree on the
following two broad propositions:
First, wherever even quite imperfect competition is feasible,
it is superior to command-and-control regulation. This
proposition has a corollary: where such regulation continues to
be necessary, as in major sectors of the traditional public
utilities, it should, to the greatest extent possible, be designed
in such a way as to be compatible with competition rather
than obstructive of it; and
Second, if competition is to work well, it requires a great
variety of governmental interventions to remedy imperfections
and market failures-interventions that, however validly they
may be characterized as regulatory, differ fundamentally from
the kind of direct economic regulation previously administered
by such agencies as the CAB and ICC, and still practiced by
most of the state public utility commissions.
32. Burkhart, Least-Cost Planning: A State Surey, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 14. 1987, at
38.
33. On the previous dissolution of this implied "regulatory compact," see Kahn,
Competition: Past, Present, and Future-Perception versu Reality, in UnUnS STRATEGIC ISSUES
FORUM 2. 3, 9-10 (Elec. Power Res. Inst. 1988), and Kahn, Who Should Pay for Power Plant
Duds? Wall St. . Aug. 15, 1985, at 26, col. 3.
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To these propositions I would attach a third, somewhat less
obvious one. A central part of the case for deregulation is the severe
deficiencies of regulation-deficiencies of information, wisdom, and
incentives, along with a strong inherent tendency to suppress
competition." If, however-as I will argue presentlys-the response
to the imperfections we have observed in the performance of the
deregulated industries is that a large share of the fault lies in the
failure of government to perform its essential competition-sup-
plementing functions, such as antitrust enforcement, then the case
for deregulation may rest upon assumptions about the ability of the
government to fulfill those supplementary responsibilities just as
unrealistic as the assumptions behind the case for direct economic
regulation. This last consideration could, in some situations, take us
full circle, back to an acceptance of full-scale regulation as the less
imperfect of the two alternatives. In most instances, I believe, it does
not.
A. Reading the Record: The Superiority of Competition5
The deregulated industries are unquestionably more competitive
today than they were previously. This is not to deny the significance
of the increased concentration at the national level in less-than-
truckload (LTL) carriage or, marginally, in airlines,36 or to daim that
the competition is sufficiently effective in all markets to have fully
taken over the role previously played by governmentally-enforced
price ceilings. It is to say that market concentration route-by-route
has definitely declined, on average, in markets of all sizes and
dimensions," and that the several indicia of competitive behavior
34. See A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 1-46.
35. Not surprisingly, the record of the effects of deregulation on perfbrmance is
much fuller and more susceptible to the drawing of conclusions-favorable or un-
favorable-in the case of industries and markets that have been thoroughly deregulated
than for the core public utilities; for this reason, the following account has relatively little
to say about the latter.
36. For a discussion of the anticompetitive consequences of the same air carriers
meeting one another in market after market, see Shepherd, The Air/ine Indushy, in THE
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 217, 225 (W. Adams ed. 1990), echoing my own almost
identical observation with respect to the chemical industry many years earlier. Kahn, The
Chemicals Industy, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 197, 208-09 (W. Adams, ed.
1950).
37. For the changes in airlines between 1983 and 1987, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, POLICIES FOR THE DEREGULATED AIRLINE INDUSTRY 17 (1988) [hereinafter CBO
REPORT] and, fbr 1978-83, see CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 14 (1984). See aLso SECRETARY'S
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 7: 325, 1990
support the same conclusion."5 The same is true of telecommunica-
tions, particularly in customer and central office equipment, long-
distance telephony, and the provision of high-speed, high-volume
transmission of data. Because of the competition unleashed by
deregulation, average prices of air travel, trucking, and long-
distance telephoning are down substantially, producing not only
TASK FORCE ON COMPETITION IN THE U.S. DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., I INDUSTRY AND ROUTE STRUCTURE 3, 11-12 (1990) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S
TASK FORCE REPORT]. The mutual interpenetration by the dominant carriers of their
respective regional markets, which has produced that result, has occurred also in LTL
trucking. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OffiCE, TRUCKING REGULATION: PRICE
COMPKIION AND MARKET STRUCTURE IN THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY 18 (1987).
38. On the case of the railroads, see MacDonald, Railroad Deregulation, Innovation, and
Competition: Effects of the Staggers Act on Grain Transportation, 32 J. L & ECON. 63, 64-65
(1989); Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct 19, 1989)
(testimony of Darius W. Gaskins, Jr., former chairman of the Interstate Commerce
Commission) [hereinafter Gaskins Statement]. With respect to the increased inter-railroad
competition in the Powder River Basin, see BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, CASE STUDY:
IMPACT OF COAL TRANSPORTATION ON WESTERN COAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE FEDERAL
COAL PROGRAM (1987).
Critics have laid heavy emphasis on the substantial air fare increases in late 1988 and
early 1989, which have reflected the industry's increased facility in playing oligopolistic
follow-the-leader. But those criticisms have dearly minimized the underlying competitive
tensions-which showed up, for example, in a sharp decline in average yields in the
ensuing months, practically all the way back to 1988 levels. This experience elicited
universal moaning in the investment community about the consequent erosion of yields and
profits. For example:
[t]he airline industry remains a very competitive business. If Congress
thinks this is not a competitive business, perhaps a brief review of some of
the promotional fare activity spreading-as competitive battles heat up-in
a number of regions will convince them. American, Pan Am and Eastern are
battling it out in Miami; America West is entering the Hawaii free-for-all;
Eastern will take on Delta in the Northeast-Florida markets and Atlanta in
hopes of regaining lost market share. USAir is attempting to slow Midway's
expansion plans in Philadelphia. And, it seems everyone wants a bigger
piece of the West Coast Corridor market, from American (San Jose) to
United (San Franisco-SFO) to Delta (Los Angeles-LAX) to USAir (LAX &
SFO) to Southwest (Oakland) to Alaska Airlines (Seattle).
Derchin & Tortora, The Airline Industy: What Happen [sic] to the Oligopoly?, in DREXEL
BURNHAM LAMBERT, Research 4 (Dec. 8, 1989).
Shortly thereafter, First Boston estimated the industry's operating profits in 1989 at
$1.95 billion, or 33 percent below the $2.95 billion reported in 1988-with the entire
decline occurring in the second half of the year. PAUL P. KAROS, FIRST BOSTON, EQUITY
RESEARCH, INDUSTRY: AIRLINES, FLIGHTLINES: EXPECT BRUTAL FOURTH QUARTER
COMPARISONS 1 (Nov. 30, 1989).
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consumer savings but net welfare improvements in the billions of
dollars each year. 9
The effect of deregulation on the relationship between the
structure of prices and costs has been more complicated. In general,
regulators tend to equalize rates to different customers despite
differences in the costs of serving them; correspondingly, competi-
tion since deregulation has apparently--despite some increases in
price discrimination, to which I will return-forced prices for the
several categories of service into closer conformity with their respec-
tive costs.' Prominent examples of this economically beneficial
change have been the increased sensitivity of air fares to the effects
on cost of length of trip and traffic density, and of transportation
rates generally to the differences between peak and off-peak and
front- and back-haul. In telephony, the prices of long-distance calling
and basic residential service have likewise come into closer confor-
mity with their respective costs.41
39. S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE EcoNoMIc EffECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION
(1986); Rose, The Incidence of Regulatory Rents in the Motor Carrier Indutry
, 
16 RAND J. ECON.
299 (1985). In the telephone case, see reference to the L. Perl study in Kahn & Shew, supra
note 28, at 209. It is of course impossible to say with certainty how much of the observed
decline in price can be attributed to deregulation-a consideration especially pertinent in
the case of the airlines, whose average fares declined secularly under regulation as well.
See Brenner, Airline Deregulation-A Case Study in Public Policy Failure, 16 TRANSP. L.J., 179,
198-99 (1988); Kahn, Airline Deregulation-A Mixed Bag, But a Clear Success Nevertheless, 16
TRANsP. LJ., 229, 235-36 (1988). Morrison and Winston have come closest to resolving the
question by reconstructing for the post-deregulation period the Standard Industry Fare
Level (SIFL) index, according to which the CAB used to set fares, and demonstrating in
this way that actual fares have indeed been consistently lower, by many billions of dollars
a year, than they would have been had those CAB policies continued in effect. Morrison
& Winston, The Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Competition, 80 AM. ECON. REV., PAPERS &
Puoc. 189 (1990).
40. MacDonald observes that the widespread use of long-term contracts for rail
carriage has been especially beneficial to large shippers; it could therefore have made
possi'ble price discriminations that were previously impermissible. His major finding,
however, is that the Staggers Act deserves substantial credit for the accelerated replacement
of single-car with much lower-cost multiple-car and unit-train shipments, which have
required the predictability and larger volumes that large shippers have been best able to
provide. The resulting breakdown of the ICC's historic policy of equalizing rates to large
and small shippers and the abandonment of unprofitable routes--the previous mandatory
service of which had likewise been beneficial mainly to small shippers--have therefore
evidently involved a closer alignment of rates with costs and so resulted, on balance, in a
diminution of discrimination. See MacDonald, supra note 38.
41. Between December 1983 and December 1989, the local telephone charges
component of the Consumer Price Index increased 19.3 percent in real terms, while the
average price of long-distance calling declined 44.5 percent interstate and 24.1 percent
intrastate. FEDERAL-STATE JOINT BOARD, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MONITORING
REPORT CC DocKr No. 87-339, at 246 (1990). This has been more the indirect than the
direct consequence of intensified competition: the FCC initially required local exchange
companies to charge long-distance companies rates far above marginal costs for access to
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Purchasers are being offered a greatly expanded range of
price/service options, most strikingly in financial services, telecom-
munications and transportation. 2
The removal of regulatory restrictions and the pressures of
competition have yielded marked increases in productivity.4 The
failure of the airline industry to realize the huge potential economies
of hub and spoke operations under regulation testifies eloquently to
the inefficiency of centralized government planning and the superi-
ority of unconstrained profit-seeking in free markets. Similarly, the
freedom of both airlines and truckers to vary their effective charges
from one moment and one route to another, depending on the
relationship between demand and capacity, has contributed powerful-
ly to improved use of equipment and consequent reductions in cost.
All of this has occurred with no evident sacrifice of safety." And,
with the glaring exception of the general decline in the quality of
the air travel experience, it has on the whole resulted in improved
quality as well as variety of service, just as any student of competi-
tion would have predicted.45
B. Imperfections of Competition and Derelictions of Government
There remain three glaring apparent exceptions to the beneficent
consequences of deregulation-the deterioration in the quality of air
travel, a sharp increase in certain kinds of price discrimination,
interstate callers. When institutional customers and interexchange carriers began to bypass
the local phone companies in order to evade these inflated charges, the FCC gradually
reduced them and substituted a direct charge on ultimate subscribers. See Kahn & Shew,
supra note 28, at 196-97.
42. Prominent among the expanded range of service offerings in transportation have
been long-term contract as well as spot rates, sharply increased intermodal carriage,
and--thanks to the spread of airline hub and spoke operations--an increased variety of
available destinations. SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 37, at 3, 149-289
(especially the discussion at 160).
43. For the case of the railroads, see Gaskins Statement, supra note 38.
44. See generally Rose, Profitability and Product Quality: Economic Determinants of
Airline Safety Perfbrmance (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with author, publication
forthcoming in J. POL ECON.); TRANSPORTATION SAFETY IN AN AGE OF DEREGULATION (L.
Moses & I. Savage ed. 1989). Statistics compiled by the Federal Highway Administration
show a decline in fatal trucking accidents of about 20 percent in 1981-85, as compared
with 1976-79, on a per mile basis. Letter from Edward H. Rastatter of the Regulatory
Review and Planning Division to Alfred E. Kahn (Sept. 16, 1987). See also CAL. PuB. UTIL.
COMM'N & HIGHWAY PATROL, REPORT ON TRUCK SAFETY, JOINT LEGISLATIVE REPORT AB
2678 (1987).
45. The one qualification of that prediction would have been a recognition of the
strong tendency of the previous regulatory regimes to encourage an inefficient inflation of
service quality. See text accompanying infia note 46.
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and-reflecting a loss of the safety or stability that the previous
pervasive restrictions on competition were supposed to preserve-the
savings and loan fiasco.
1. Discomfort and Congestion in Air TRavel
The first thing to observe about the increase in congestion,
crowding and delay in aviation is that they reflect success, not
failure. A major criticism of regulation had been that, by discour-
aging price competition, it had on the one side encouraged ineffi-
cient competition of a cost-inflating, quality-enhancing character46
and, on the other, failed to probe the price elasticity of potential
demand. Deregulation has eliminated the distortion and made good
the failure. The result has been deeply discounted fares-necessarily
for service in fuller planes, with tighter seating and a lower ratio of
ticket agents and flight attendants to passengers. It has been the
enthusiastic response of travelers to this new option that has taxed
the capacity of our airports and air traffic control systems, and the
patience of travelers.
Neither an economist nor a government official is competent to
decide whether the lower-quality service provided at a lower price
is superior to the higher price/quality option exclusively available
before. It is the task of an efficiently-functioning market to offer
customers the choice, to the extent it is feasible to do so. The
inefficiency of regulatory cartelization, corrected by deregulation, was
that it suppressed the former option.
To some extent, unregulated competition has had the equally
deplorable opposite effect: travelers who pay full fare suffer along
with the ones who buy the discount tickets from long lines, uncom-
fortable seating and delays. This spillover effect might suggest there
is no basis for concluding that there has been a net welfare im-
provement.
There are several reasons for rejecting that implication. First, the
superior service option has not disappeared: the airlines compete
strenuously for the patronage of the regular full-fare-paying cus-
tomers, with frequent flyer credits, upgrades, separate lines, and,
where feasible, separate business class service.
Second, to the extent that it is not feasible to provide full-fare-
paying passengers a fully differentiated service-wider seating than
46. For a broad exposition of this proposition across various industries, see A. KAHN,
supra note 2. at 10, 189 (trucking), 206-20 (securities brokerage and airlines).
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their discount-fare-paying fellow travelers, for example-it is a
general principle, and on balance a beneficent one, that in a market
economy the majority of dollar votes rules, at the necessary expense
of minority preferences, when the two cannot be reconciled."'
Finally, the general increase in congestion and the failure of the
market to offer delay-free travel to customers willing to pay for it
are, above all, a consequence of severe derelictions on the part of
government. During my tenure as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, I pointed out that it was the responsibility of government to
respond to the increased demands generated by the competitive
forces we were unleashing, by expanding airport and air traffic
control capacity, and by pricing access to those scarce facilities
rationally."
2. Intensifcation of Price Discrimination
Most of the history of economic regulation can be written around
the phenomenon of price discrimination. Discriminations by the
railroads inspired our first major venture in regulation. Regulators,
hostile to even cost-justified price differentiations, have frequently
required discrimination, in the interest of "equity." On the other
hand, regulators have long recognized the possible economic benefits
of discrimination in the presence of economies of scale and scope,
and of overall revenue constraints defined in terms of historic or
embedded costs.49
47. See Kahn & Shew, supra note 28, at 229-32 (discussing "collective consumption
decisions").
48. See, e.g., Address by Alfred E. Kahn, Federal Aviation Administration Consultative
Planning Conference (Mar. 22, 1978). See also Levine, Landing Fees and the Airpot Congestion
Problem, 12 J. L. & Econ. 63, 79-108 (1969).
The Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) in 1988 shifted the basis for landing fees
at Boston's Logan Airport from weight of aircraft to the number of operations. The
Department of Transportation (DOT) ordered Massport to withdraw those altered charges
on the ground that they were discriminatory, because, among other reasons, they entailed
higher charges per passenger on smaller than on larger planes. What DOT failed abysmally
to understand was that it was the previous charges that were discriminatory: the change to
which it objected was fully justified by differences in the respective marginal costs of serving
the two classes of customers. On the other hand, the new fee schedules' failure to
differentiate peak and off-peak landings was admittedly an imperfection, which Massport
had promised to remedy.
49. Observe, for example, the unrestricted pricing freedom conferred on the railroads
by the Staggers Act, within the limits of 180 percent of average variable costs and overall
revenue adequacy. 49 U.S.C. § 1701a (d)(2). See also T. KEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT AND
PUBLIC Poucy 98-101 (1983).
346
Vol. 7: 325, 1990
Regulation in the 1990s
Even ardent deregulators have understood that unregulated price
competition in the public utility industries would probably be highly
selective and localized, with its benefits available only to some well-
situated customers, because of the ubiquity of the monopoly power
that counselled regulation in the first place. Many of us have been
surprised, however, to find discrimination increasing also with the
deregulation of industries that we thought were potentially struc-
turally competitive. Borenstein and Rose have demonstrated une-
quivocally that price discrimination in the airline industry has in
some respects increased, substantially and significantly, as markets
have become less concentrated. 0
Manifestly, the instances of sharply increased price discrimination
that deregulation has made possible in airlines and railroads are
both a competitive and a monopolistic phenomenon. They reflect
intense competition for the traffic most likely to be attracted by price
differences among competitors. They have also promoted economic
efficiency in very important ways. The ability of the railroads to
price down toward incremental cost has improved the distribution
of the transportation function among the competing modes; their
ability to charge rates for demand-inelastic traffic incorporating wider
margins above variable costs has contributed to an improvement in
their financial condition, which has helped them to finance major
improvements in trackage, equipment and service, without yielding
excessive returns in the aggregate. The deeply discounted fares to
discretionary air travelers fill seats that would otherwise remain
empty and help make possible more frequent scheduling, which is
particularly valuable to the full-fare travelers.
Manifestly, however, the discriminations also reflect the exercise
of monopoly power no longer curbed by direct price regulation.
The reasons for the return of monopoly power to the airline
industry, following upon the intensified competition of the early
1980s, and the way in which it has been exercised to produce sharp
increases in the unrestricted fares paid by about 10 percent of the
50. Borenstein & Rose, Competitive Price Discrimination in the U.S. Airline Industry
(1989) (unpublished manuscript available at University of Michigan Institute of Public Policy
Studies). Their results do not necessarily conflict with my previous observation that in other
respects price discrimination has been reduced significantly. Borenstein and Rose's findings
relate to an increased dispersion of the fares charged different passengers on individual
routes; my observation related to the structure of fares fbr different routes, times of day
and modes of travel. On the other hand, a marked increase has occurred in discrimination
in the fares carriers charge on different routes depending on the extent to which they
encounter competition on them. See text accompanying infra note 51.
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travelers, is by now a familiar story." The increasing sophistication
with which the leading carriers--particularly the ones with the most
fully developed computerized reservations systems-have learned to
practice what the industry euphemistically calls "yield management"
has enabled them to take full advantage of that monopoly power,
while also erecting possibly insurmountable barriers to entry by truly
new competitors. 2
There are three possible ways in which government might
respond to this equivocal situation.
It could do nothing. We put up with a great deal of competitive
imperfection in industries that we would not think of regulating. It
is by no means dear that unrestricted fares exceed the stand-alone
costs of serving the minority of passengers who pay them, or that
the discrimination to which those travelers are subject is not com-
pensated for by frequent. flyer credits" and the improved con-
venience of scheduling that the high fares help make possible. The
airline industry is far more competitive than it was; the 'benefits of
that competition have been widely distributed; and the industry is
evidently not earning monopoly profits. In these circumstances, it
would not be ridiculous to condude that no remedy was required.
Second, however, the government clearly has neglected respon-
sibilities of which it was never the intention of deregulation to
relieve it. These include vigilant policing of safety practices, the
provision of the requisite airport and air traffic control capacity 4
and pricing access to them rationally, and vigorous enforcement of
the antitrust laws, along with other policies designed to remove
51. See, e.g.. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-61, 131-41 (1989) (statement
of Kenneth M. Mead, Director, Transportation Issues, Resources, Community and Economic
Development Division, U.S. General Accounting Office) [hereinafter Mead Statement]; CBO
REORT, supra note 37, at 23-36; SEcRTARY'S TASK FORCE ON COMPE'=rON IN THE U.S.
DOMESTIC AIRUNE INDUSTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., I PRICING 3-4 (1990); Borenstein,
Hubs and High Fares: Airport Dominance and Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 RAND
J. ECON. 344 (1989); Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy,
and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393 (1987).
52. For these complicated reasons. Shepherd is both correct and at best telling only
part of the story when, under the heading of "price discrimination." he concludes that
"airline pricing behavior has virtually ceased to be a competitive weapon and has become
instead a complex process by which an airline tries to maximize the revenue it extracts
from its customers." Shepherd. supra note 36. at 232.
53. On the especial attractiveness of these credits as a device for retaining the
patronage of the full-fare-paying passenger, see Levine, supra note 51, at 452-54.
54. An alternative dearly worth considering would be to permit private entrepreneurs
to fulfill this function in whole or in part. A leading proponent of privatization is Robert
W. Poole, Jr.. of the Reason Foundation. See Poole, Toward Safer Skies, in INSTEAD OF
REGULATION (R. Poole ed. 1982).
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barriers to competition. Prominent among such supplementary
policies would be expansion of airport capacity sufficient to keep
open opportunities for competitive challenges to hub-dominating
carriers and dissolution of preferential arrangements between those
carriers and their hub airports." The bill recently introduced by
Senators Danforth and McCain is a long overdue initiative along the
latter lines.56
Finally, however, it is not possible in principle to reject the
reimposition of price ceilings to protect travelers subject to monop-
olistic exploitation, where restoration of more effective competition
proves to be infeasible.
My own endorsement of the second approach and reluctance to
embark upon the third-a position with which most economists
would probably agree-is heavily influenced by the lesson of history
that, once introduced, direct (as contrasted with competition-sup-
plementing) regulation has both a logical and almost irresistible
tendency to spread. Price ceilings would be of little value if they
were not accompanied by the introduction of floors under quality of
service. It takes little imagination to see where that logic might
lead-to prohibitions of reductions in the frequency of scheduling
and in the frequency with which full-fare paying customers are
upgraded to first class; stipulations about the minimum quality of
meals; maximum charges for head sets; and maximum length of
lines at the ticket counter. These examples are not fanciful: all but
one of them were adopted under regulation, in mirror image, to
prevent competitive evasions of governmentally-set price floors.
3. The Savings and Loan Fiasco
The flood of savings and loan bank failures and the consequent
multi-hundred-billion-dollar cost to the Federal Government dramat-
ically underscores the second of the three propositions with which
I introduced this appraisal of the record-namely, that economic
deregulation cannot mean firing the police force. It also, however,
inescapably raises the question implicit in the third one: may not
55. See Mead Statement, supra note 51, at 4-5; SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON
COMPErTION IN THE U.S. DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUs"RY, U.S. DEP'r OF TRANSP., AIRPORTS,
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND RELATED CONCERNS (IMPACT ON ENTRY), ch. 3 (1990).
56. S. 1741, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The bill, entitled "A Bill to Amend the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to Increase Competition Among Commercial Air Carriers at
the Nation's Major Airports and for Other Purposes," was introduced by Senators McCain,
Danforth and Bradley on October 6, 1989.
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deregulation in some circumstances put on police forces burdens
heavier than they can realistically be expected to bear?
In retrospect, the causes of the massive failures are clear. They
were the consequence of our having removed the regulatory ceilings
on interest rates payable to depositors, which in turn necessitated a
relaxation of the restrictions on the kinds of lending and investment
activities in which those institutions were permitted to engage. What
we evidently failed to recognize was that removal of these restric-
tions, while retaining Federal deposit insurance, openly invited the
more speculative if not reckless lending and outright fraud that,
along with a good deal of bad luck, produced the present debacle.
So long as the government guaranteed their deposits, institutions
whose assets may have been worth far less than their liabilities could
nevertheless continue to attract deposits by offering higher interest
rates, and could engage in additional risky investments-as well as
continued peculation. If those ventures proved successful, the owners
could not only remain in business but could make large profits; if
they failed, it would be the Federal Savings and Loan Deposit
Insurance Corporation that would be left holding the bag-as indeed
it was.57
In short, deregulation, particularly in the presence of Federal
deposit insurance, enormously increased the necessity for vigilant
bank examination, enforcement of capital requirements sufficient to
provide a cushion against losses, varying deposit insurance premiums
with the riskiness of the lending and investing activities of the
insured institutions, and a readiness to dose down S&Ls that were
effectively insolvent.
C. The Future Direction: Coming Pull Circle?
This kind of defense of the deregulation record-"It wasn't my
fault, the trouble is you other people didn't do your job"-is a trifle
glib. It contains more than a trace of justifying the abandonment of
direct regulation, because of its severe imperfections, in terms that
implicitly demand perfection of performance by such agencies as the
Department of Transportation, the Savings and Loan Bank Board
57. See Andrews, Is There Any Way Out of the Deposit Insurance Crisis?, INsTTMrrLONAL
INVE SroR, Sept. 1988, at 86; Bush, Former FHLBB Regulators Offer Solutions to the Current
FSIIC Crisis, SAVINGS INsiTruTONS, Oct. 1988, at 81; O'Driscoll, Bank Failures: The Deposit
Insurance Connection, Cowm P. POLY Issur., Apr. 1988, at 1. O'Driscoll would disagree
with this diagnosis only to the extent it assigns blame to the removal of restrictions on the
asset side; he contends that diversification alone would have reduced risk.
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and Congress-higher levels of prescience, conscientiousness, infor-
mation, incorruptibility or simple effectiveness than can reasonably
be expected.
To some extent, similarly, thrusting upon the antitrust authori-
ties both blame for some of the monopolistic consequences of airline
deregulation and responsibility for their future remedy implicitly
expects more of competition-preserving policies than they can
deliver. It is possible to identify fewer than a handful of mergers
and code-sharing (i.e., traffic-interchange) agreements that probably
should not have been permitted on antitrust grounds; most of the
mergers that have reconcentrated the industry were more a reflec-
tion of the economies of networking and the inability of smaller
competitors to, survive in open competition than they were an
independent cause of its attenuation. Again, the greatest disad-
vantage borne today by airlines dependent on the computerized
reservations systems of their major rivals is apparently the high
booking fees they have to pay; but these raise the inescapable
consideration that the high profits of the system owners may be a
reasonable reward for an important innovation; and the possible
divestiture cure has never, to my knowledge, confronted the possible
sacrifice of economies of integration. Yet again, frequent flyer credits
augment the monopoly power of the larger carriers, and particu-
larly the ones dominating the hubs used by business travelers; but
it would be difficult to attack them directly, because they are a form
of price competition. Moreover, the logical remedy of subjecting
them to income tax when the purchases that generated them were
treated as deductible business expenses would apparently be an
administrative nightmare. Finally, an attack on predatory pricing
would involve all-too-familiar difficulties of distinguishing unaccept-
able price discriminations from legitimate competitive responses and
welfare-enhancing exploitations of the economies of scale and scope."
58. These reservations about the likely efficacy of antitrust should not be construed
as in any way diluting my firm advocacy of vigorous competition-preserving and enhancing
policies, in preference to reregulation.
On the desirability of a forthright attack on practices that might be regarded as
predatory, for example, I am among the minority of American economists who feel that our
profession and the courts have gone much too far in the direction of minimizing the
likelihood of predation and the threat to competition it may pose. See, for example, the
decision by the CAB, under my Chairmanship, to limit the permissible competitive response
of the International Air Transport Association carriers to the intensified competition on
trans-Atlantic routes of the charters and Freddie Laker-an effort ultimately overturned by
President Carter; my warning of the dangers (which have in fact materialized) of a
successful price response of the incumbent carriers to the prospective entry of World and
Capitol into the transcontinental market, in Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CALIF. L.
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Competition can in some circumstances make unrealistic demands
on consumers as well-assuming a greater ability on their part to
make complex choices, on pain of suffering penalties to which they
had not previously been subjected, than they either have or are
willing to take the trouble to acquire. A poignant illustration of the
resulting dilemma has been provided in recent years by providers of
alternate telephone operator services, which have entered into
arrangements with non-telephone-company owners of public tele-
phones, hotels, and other such institutions serving transient cus-
tomers, under which, in exchange for commissions to the owners,
they receive the right to provide operator services and charge what
they please. The problems arise because the transient caller is an
often unwitting captive to such arrangements between the other two
parties. The competitive solution would be to permit this kind of
free entry, while requiring comprehensive disclosure of the system
of charges and, probably also, that callers be offered the opportunity
to be transferred without charge to the long distance carrier of their
own choice. Conceivably, however, the burden on consumers of
digesting such information and choosing may outweigh the benefits
of competition; one is reminded of Oscar Wilde's analogous obser-
vation: "The trouble with Socialism is that it uses up too many even-
ings."
Conclusion
I can take solace from the equivocal nature of these observations
in the fact that I have been consistent in my equivocation. The
beginning of wisdom in the devising of regulatory and deregulatory
policies must be, as I put it in celebrating the "passing of the public
utility concept,"
a skepticism of the universal efficiency of both the unregu-
lated market, on the one side, and of government enterprise
on the other, sufficient to make it impossible for me simply to
abandon the regulatory tool. Competition and regulation are
both highly imperfect institutions. So is antitrust. It should not
REv., 1059, 1060-68 (1987); see also Kahn, The Macroeconomic Consequences of Sensible
Microeconomic Policies, The First Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government,
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association and Society of Government
Economists 11-15 (Nat. Econ. Res. Assoc. 1985).
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be surprising, therefore, that there is no single choice between
them equally valid for all times and places.... .
The experience of the last decade or so justifies a somewhat less
fatuous conclusion. I believe it has confirmed our historic presump-
tion in favor of competitive markets: against the deregulatory fiasco
of the S&Ls must be weighed the regulatory fiascos of nuclear power
plant construction and the shortages and extreme distortions of
natural gas markets during this same decade. Our recent experience
demonstrates also that free markets may demand governmental
interventions just as pervasive and quite possibly more imaginative
than direct regulation; but its lesson is that those interventions
should to the greatest extent possible preserve, supplement, and
enhance competition, rather than suppress it. Finally, to the extent
direct economic regulation continues to be required, it is preferable
that it be of a kind compatible with competition, rather than
obstructive of it.
In short, the lesson I take from recent history is that the
evolution of regulatory policy will never come to an end. The path
it takes--and we should make every effort to see that it
takes-however, is the path not of a full circle or pendulum, which
would take us back to where we started, but of a spiral, which has
59. Kahn, A Reprise, supra note 7, at 26. For a recent, persuasive exposition of the
ubiquity of market failure-as well as regulatory failure-in transportation, see Kay &
Thompson, Regulatory Reform in Transport in the UK: Principles and Application (Oct.
1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with Center for Business Strategy, London Business
School).
It is important for me to make clear what it is that I have been consistently equivocal
about. It has to do with selecting the set of institutional arrangements best suited to
achieving economically optimal results, not with the propriety of economic efficiency as the
primary goal of regulatory (or deregulatory) policy.
In contrast, the debate between advocates of regulation and deregulation is in very large
measure about the latter, not the former issue. Opponents of deregulation will often pro-
test--sometimes truculently, I can attest-that efficiency is not and should not be the sole
or even the primary end of economic regulation. While I endorse the proposition that
fairness and a more equitable distribution of income should be central goals of public
policy, I also insist that proponents of such goals have every obligation to be just as
rigorous in thinking about how they may best be served as the advocates of pure economic
efficiency. And "best," in a world of scarcity, must mean "at minimum social cost."
Restrictions on entry and price competition and distortions of the relationship between
prices and marginal cost are usually irrational ways of achieving those ends, and to the
extent regulation has served them in these ways, it has typically done so at excessive social
cost. From this standpoint, one of the major accomplishments of deregulation has been to
force us to seek more rational ways of achieving those goals. Neither privately nor
governmentally-administered syndicalism or cartelization is a sensible way either to remedy
the failures of unregulated market capitalism or to achieve a more humane distribution
of income.
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a direction. This is in a sense only an expression of a preference for
seeking consistently to move in the direction of the first-best
functioning of a market economy, rather than the second- or third-
best world of centralized command and control.
